Dr. Mahmoud Zakaria‏‏

Located in the African Sahel region, Chad has recently witnessed radical security transformations in the fight against terrorism. This is primarily associated with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s threat, on 3 November 2024, to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) affiliated with the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), whose mandate is to combat Boko Haram. This announcement came after a 27 October 2024 terrorist attack on a Chadian military base located in Barkaram on Lake Chad. The attack, which killed at least 40 Chadian soldiers, prompted the Chadian president to announce the launch of the "Haskanit" military operation to counter these terrorist threats. These developments have raised questions about Chad’s threatened withdrawal from the MNJTF and the possible future trajectories resulting from such a withdrawal.Main ImplicationsThere are several key implications for Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s threatened withdrawal from the MNJTF, including the following:1- Growing frequency and severity of terrorist activity: Perhaps the most recent manifestation of this was the terrorist attack by Boko Haram fighters on a Chadian army base located in Barkaram, on an island in the Kaya department in the Lac region. The attack, which killed at least 40 Chadian soldiers, is one of the most violent attacks against Chad in 2024, particularly after the Chadian army, in cooperation with the armies of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin, inflicted heavy losses on the ISIS-affiliated branch of Boko Haram, known as ISIS West Africa Province.2- Chad’s belief that the Multinational Joint Task Force is ineffective: The president of Chad’s 3 November 2024 announcement is directly linked to the MNJTF’s failure to combat terrorism in Chad, as confirmed by the absence of joint efforts against the enemy even though the task force was formed with the goal of combining efforts and intelligence. It is worth noting that the task force’s roots go back to 1994, when Nigeria established it to stop transnational theft in the Lake Chad Basin and facilitate freedom of movement across the northeastern border of Nigeria. Although this task force initially consisted only of Nigerian army forces, it operated based on communication and cooperation with the security agencies of LCBC member countries. It was headquartered in the city of Baga, in Nigeria’s Borno Province. By 1998, the task force had gained momentum and became a multinational force with the addition of Chadian forces. During that phase, the task force was charged with combatting joint transnational security challenges in the Lake Chad Basin. The establishment of this task force changed the course of events and improved the uneasy security position in this region until 2009, when Boko Haram appeared on the scene and caused the security situation to deteriorate once again.The task force’s mandate was further increased in April 2012, to include counterinsurgency and counter-sabotage. Due to the deteriorating security situation in the Lake Chad region, Boko Haram’s territorial control in northwestern Nigeria, and the increasing spillover of violence into countries neighboring Nigeria since early 2014, the defense ministers and chiefs-of-staff of the LCBC countries met in Yaoundé in March 2014, and decided to establish a multinational task force to achieve peace and security in the region.In effect, this task force was formed by a decision of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the LCBC, held in Niamey, Niger, on 7 October 2014. The task force was deployed in January 2015, and it includes the LCBC member states of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, in addition to Benin, a non-member state in the Commission.3- Chad’s preference for independent national military counterterrorism operations: The most recent of these military operations is Operation Haskanit, announced by President Mahamat Idriss Déby in October 2024. It takes its name from the Arabic word, "al-hasak," that refers to a very resistant, thorny plant found mainly in desert regions and known widely in Chad, Sudan, and the Greater Sahara. Its shape resembles a cactus plant, and it is able to survive in arid conditions. This military operation is led by the president of Chad in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces. The president was a former general in the army before he became the leader of Chad after his father, Idriss Déby, was killed four years ago in a battle with rebels in April 2021.As part of this operation, Déby reorganized the armed forces to adapt to the asymmetric fighting tactics used by terrorist groups and to enhance border security and protect citizens. It is worth noting that the Chadian army previously launched a military operation against Boko Haram positions in the forests and on islands in the middle of Lake Chad in July 2024, killing at least 70 Boko Haram fighters. Chad’s army also conducted several military operations in other Sahel countries, including against al-Qaeda strongholds in northern Mali in 2013.4- The ruling regime’s recourse to a crisis management strategy: This strategy is based on the idea of ​​a "forward retreat" by turning public interest away from the crises of the political regime at home and directing it abroad, especially since Chad is preparing for legislative elections in late December 2024. These elections are being boycotted by political opposition parties, which have indicated that conditions are not conducive to organizing free and transparent elections. In fact, the most prominent opposition figure— Succès&nbsp;Masra, a candidate in the last presidential elections—has declared that the upcoming elections are merely a sham. It is worth noting the prime importance of these elections, given that they are the first legislative elections since 2011, and they come amid a tough security context linked to the escalation of terrorist attacks on the borders with Nigeria and Niger and the ongoing internal conflict in Sudan since 15 April 2023.Possible TrajectoriesThere are a number of possible paths that might follow from Chad’s potential withdrawal from the MNJTF to fight Boko Haram, including the following:1- Move away from security coordination and cooperation with France: This is supported by the growing state of discontent and resentment in recent years regarding France’s ineffective security roles, whether on the part of political elites represented by transitional military regimes, or the peoples of the Sahel region in general. This has been clearly evident in France’s gradual military withdrawal from the countries of this region, beginning with the end of Operation Barkhane in Mali in August 2022, followed by the termination of Operation Sabre in Burkina Faso in February 2023, and the closing of the 1500-member military base in Niger in December 2023.2- Potential security rapprochement with the US: This is supported by the US army’s announcement of a redeployment of its troops in Chad at the latter’s request. In a press interview on 20 September 2024, Major General Kenneth Ekman of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) added that no date has been set for the redeployment, and he confirmed that a limited number of special forces would be deployed due to the growing hostility in the region towards the presence of foreign military bases. It is worth noting that this step comes after the US Department of Defense withdrew its forces from Chad about six months ago, in late April 2024, at the request of the ruling authorities there.3- Growing opportunities to promote security ties with Russia: This is reinforced by the recent growth of interactions between the two parties. Perhaps most notably, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that its forces would conduct a joint military operation with the Chadian army in May 2024. This operation resulted in the liberation of about 21 Chadian soldiers who had been held hostage for more than nine months by extremist groups in the Central African Republic. In addition, Russian Foreign Minister <a href="https://www.ajnet.me/encyclopedia/2014/10/13/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%BA%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%81" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Sergei Lavrov</a> visited Chad in June 2024. The first of its kind in about 60 years, the visit included bilateral discussions on the key topic of security cooperation. The parties agreed to develop security cooperation in response to the ongoing security threats in the African Sahel region.The Russians pledged to supply the Chadian army with arms and military equipment to enhance its defense capabilities and its ability to fight terrorism in Chad. Prior to this, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby visited Russia in January 2024, where he expressed his aspiration to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries. Although the two nations signed a joint cooperation agreement in 2013, their relations remained limited, especially after the death of former president Idriss Déby in 2021, when Chad accused the Russians of using the Wagner Group to provoke destabilizing movements on Chad’s borders.4- Trend toward involvement in emerging regional security arrangements: This is associated with the rift facing traditional multi-party regional arrangements in the African Sahel, most notably the G5 Sahel, whose only remaining members are Chad and Mauritania after the withdrawal of Mali and Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023. The latter countries formed the Sahel Alliance in September 2023 and moved to establish a regional force to combat terrorism in March 2024.Chad is attempting to build security ties with the Sahel Alliance. In May 2024, the country participated in military exercises in the Tahoua region in southwestern Niger, near the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, where armed groups loyal to al-Qaeda and ISIS are active. These maneuvers were called "Tarhna Kali," a term from the Tamasheq language spoken by the Tuareg of the Greater Sahara, meaning "love of the homeland." They aimed to enhance the operational capabilities and resilience of the armed forces of the Sahel Alliance countries against any potential security threats, through tactical maneuvers and initiatives to promote relationships with the local population.In conclusion, it can be said that Chad’s potential upcoming withdrawal from the MNJTF may raise major problems regarding the effectiveness of the roles played by this task force in fighting security threats in general, and terrorism in particular, in the Lake Chad Basin. On the other hand, it may also put additional operational pressure on the Chadian army to combat the mounting threats of terrorist groups. This vision of the future moves Chad toward creating security ties with new implications for countering terrorism in the coming period, most notably enhancing ties with the Sahel Alliance countries and Russia, with a cautious approach towards the US.

Chad Threatens to Withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force