Dr. Muhammad Abbas Naji‏‏

The Iranian regime is currently facing one of its toughest challenges in over four decades. Despite enduring many external crises since 1979, the current one may be the most significant threat to its rule. Following the assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli attack on southern Beirut on September 28, 2024, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei denied that this would impact Hezbollah's unity. However, fears still linger in the Iranian regime towards the repercussions of this operation especially amid security infiltrations of Iran’s proxies, which resulted in the assassination of Hamas' political chief Ismail Haniyeh in an Iranian Revolutionary Guard facility, on the 31st of July 2024.Reports indicate that Khamenei has been relocated to a safer area in Tehran. His son, Mogtabi Khameni, his potential successor, has announced discontinuing his "Advanced Islamic Jurisprudence and Principles" class for over 700 students. It is worth noting that this stage of teaching represents the final step toward earning the highest degree in Ijtihad jurisprudence. Many viewed this as an attempt to protect the Supreme Leader’s son from a potential attack.Potential RepercussionsThe unfolding war in Lebanon imposes immense pressure on Iran and brings a myriad of consequences, which can be summarized as follows:1- Increased likelihood of direct conflict with Israel: Israel’s continued military escalation against regional adversaries suggests it no longer rules out direct conflict with Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent direct threatening messages to Iran during his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 2024, hours before the assassination of Nasrallah, stating that if Iran attacks Israel, it will attack it everywhere. This reflects the vision of the current ruling elite in Tel Aviv: to prevent another October 7th, Israel must eliminate the military capabilities of its adversaries.2- Expediting the production of a nuclear bomb: Close circles to the Iranian regime review the current developments as a strategic plan by the US and Israel for eliminating the so-called "Axis of Resistance". This would enable them to reconstruct security order in the Middle East in accordance with their interests. Iran undoubtedly realizes that its extensive efforts to build regional deterrence, intended as the primary mechanism to protect it from external threats and minimize the risk of direct war, have not achieved their desired outcomes. This was evident in the elimination of its proxies’ military capabilities, and the assassination of Hezbollah’s leader. Hence, the possibility that Israeli operations could escalate into a military attack against it, will prompt Tehran to adopt alternative defensive mechanisms such as possessing the nuclear bomb. Numerous Iranian officials have already hinted at the possibility of Iran moving towards "changing its nuclear doctrine", referring to the possibility of amending the Fatwah issued by the Supreme Leader of in 2003, which prohibits the production and storage of nuclear weapons or completely abolishing them. Iran already possesses fissile material sufficient to complete a nuclear bomb; however, it still lacks key technical components, such as a nuclear detonator and missile warheads. In this context, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued a report on August 29, 2024, stating that the amount of uranium enriched by Iran at different rates reached 5751.8 kg, which is 28-fold what is stipulated in the nuclear agreement (202.8 kg). The amount of uranium enriched to 60% - the closest to the level needed to produce a bomb (90%) - reached 164.7 kg, an amount that only needs 2 kg to be enough to produce four nuclear bombs if Iran decides to take this path. Kamal Kharrazi, the former Foreign Minister and President of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, and close to the leader Khamenei, stated that Iran may change its nuclear doctrine if it is threatened.3- A rift in relations between Iran and its proxies: Despite the statement issued by the Iranian embassy in Beirut on September 27, 2024, which threatened that these military operations will change the rules of the game, Iran still embraces an 'appeasement' stance toward Israel's military actions against Iran. This could negatively affect relations between Iran and its proxies in the region, in addition to its Sunni allies such as the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements.Iran has refrained from intervening militarily to support its proxies, whether Hamas or Hezbollah. In the first case, it was keen from the beginning to distance itself from Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood". In Lebanon, it sent messages to Hezbollah that it is not prepared to engage in a regional war with Israel.This could prompt proxies to expand their activities locally and regionally in ways that may diverge from Iran's interests, especially as Iranian influence over them has weakened since the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the former Quds Force commander, on January 3, 2020.4- Uncertainty in the operational movements of Iran's regional proxies: The strong military strikes that Hezbollah was subjected to may affect the field movements of other agents, in light of the prominent role that the party was playing— in two ways. First, trying to mediate between some loyal militias, which sometimes have disputes and conflicts over wealth and influence, similar to what is happening between Shiite militias in Iraq. Second, training military calibres in the militias to use heavy weapons such as ballistic missiles and drones, as is happening with the Houthi militia in Yemen.Hezbollah's current preoccupation with reorganizing its ranks, through appointing a Secretary-General and first-line leaders, will distract the group from the role that it has been playing in the past few years. Some literature suggested that Hezbollah – and not the commander of the Quds Force Esmail Qaani – is the one who inherited the legacy of Soleimani after his assassination.5- Regional countries’ exposure to Iranian and militia threats: The government of newly-elected President Massoud Pezeshkian is currently seeking to improve relations with neighboring countries, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. He is also planning to visit Qatar on September 30, 2024. However, Iran’s security exposure to the war waged by Israel in Lebanon may push it to take escalatory measures that may affect its relations with those countries.The frequency of Iranian threats, particularly from the Revolutionary Guard, may once again target American interests and bases in the Arabian Gulf. Iran will also likely allow its loyal militias to adopt the same approach, and signs of this have already begun to appear. For example, the Secretary-General of the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada militia in Iraq, Abu Alaa al-Waili, issued a statement on September 27, 2024, threatening to target UAE interests in the event of a war. The so-called Islamic Resistance in Bahrain - Saraya al-Ashtar also issued a statement on September 21, 2024, "blessing" the "martyrdom of Hezbollah leader Ibrahim Aqeel" and affirming "unity against the Zionist-American axis of evil".A Critical DilemmaIn conclusion, it can be argued that the Iranian regime is facing a critical dilemma at the present stage. The pressures to intervene in support of its agents are considerable, potentially compelling Iran to engage in the current escalation, despite the serious consequences involved. Conversely, maintaining its stance of avoiding Israeli provocations or the perceived 'trap' set by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could undermine Iran's future control over its agents.

How Is Iran Approaching the Post-Lebanon War Phase?